Set-based bayesianism

Ieee Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics A 26 (3):324--339 (1996)
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Abstract

Problems for strict and convex Bayesianism are discussed. A set-based Bayesianism generalizing convex Bayesianism and intervalism is proposed. This approach abandons not only the strict Bayesian requirement of a unique real-valued probability function in any decision-making context but also the requirement of convexity for a set-based representation of uncertainty. Levi's E-admissibility decision criterion is retained and is shown to be applicable in the nonconvex case.

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