What is wrong with minimal foundationalism?

Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184 (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

attacks new defenders of foundationalism. Some simply took on the critics, 2 but others attempted to argue that even if the critics were right, only one form of foundationalism was suspect, not foundationalism itself. For, according to these defenders, foundationalism is not to be identified with the view of Classical Foundationalism (CE) that all of our knowledge rests on incorrigible beliefs. Rather foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests on beliefs that are self-warranting in some sense. Thus, even if CF is false, it does not follow that foundationalism is false.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The confusion over foundationalism.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1986 - Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
Psychological Foundationalism.Robert Audi - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):592-610.
Chisholm's Grand Move.Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (5):563-581.
Skepticism and the Foundations of Empirical Justification.Ali Hasan - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Washington
Rorty's critique of foundationalism.Timm Triplett - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):115 - 129.
Benign Infinity.Matthias Steup - 2019 - In Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein. Springer Verlag. pp. 235-57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
100 (#211,908)

6 months
11 (#352,895)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
Is Foundationalism Indefinable?James A. Martin - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):128-142.
Is foundationalism indefinable?James A. Martin - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):128–142.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references