Two problems with “self-deception”: No “self” and no “deception”

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):32-33 (2011)
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Abstract

While the idea that being wrong can be strategically advantageous in the context of social strategy is sound, the idea that there is a “self” to be deceived might not be. The modular view of the mind finesses this difficulty and is useful – perhaps necessary – for discussing the phenomena currently grouped under the term “self-deception.”

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References found in this work

The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby - 1992 - Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby.
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel Clement Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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