The Logic Of Lying

Sorites 17:27-30 (2006)
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Abstract

By definition, a lie is a dishonestly made statement. It is a wilful misrepresentation, in one's statement, of one's beliefs. Both a truthful person and a liar could hold false beliefs. We should not uncritically regard an untruthfully made statement as an untrue statement, or a truthfully made statement as a true statement. The only instance when a lie is necessarily false is when the liar's corresponding belief that was distorted was true. In other instances, the lie could be either true or false. We conclude that a lie is not necessarily a false statement

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