Abstract

This dissertation provides an account of individual autonomy. It begins by arguing that the dispute, in social and political philosophy, between negative and positive conceptions of liberty, can only be solved based on a theory of autonomy. The bulk of the dissertation then defends the view that individual autonomy consists in the capacity to regulate one's actions by values that are one's own in virtue of having been adopted through a process of critical reflection. ;This sort of view is regarded with suspicion by those who doubt that rational judgment is central to a person's self, or identity. In particular, conative hierarchy views analyze autonomy as the capacity to act according to higher-order desires. But by doing so, they trivialize real worries about the possibility of achieving autonomy: Marxist social theory and Freudian psychoanalytic theory both seem to imply that autonomy is very difficult to achieve, and yet they do not pose any threat to the kind of "autonomy" described by conative hierarchy theories. Conative hierarchy theory fails to show that highest-order desires have special authority. ;Conative history theory recognizes that autonomy involves historical features in addition to structural ones. According to one version of that theory, a desire is autonomous if its subject would not have resisted its development, had she reflected on it with all relevant information about the processes involved, and with 'minimal rationality'. But the test fails when applied to hard cases, because it ignores the way in which the person's motives must depend causally upon her rational capacities. Furthermore, this view mistakenly follows conative hierarchy theory in denying the relevance of the distinction between a person's evaluative judgment and her mere desires. ;The conception of autonomy I defend derives support from the shortcomings of the two types of conative view. Their focus on desires masks the importance of values, principles, and ends. Most importantly, however, their shortcomings indicate that an autonomous person's values must be contingent upon critical reflection, which is free from certain irrational influences, even if its principles lack the universal validity of a categorical imperative