Pluralistic Internalism

Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 42 (1):83-100 (2015)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to identify and defend a broad biologically informed internalist position. This internalism is pluralistic because it more explicitly identifies the range of ‘best light’ sporting practices than previous internalist literature. As such, it may help to solve a long-standing debate between broad internalists or interpretivists, as they are also called, and conventionalists. I present six models of sport that reflect different normative stances on testing and contesting acts. Each one is grounded in what I claim to be an element of our more or less durable, but not metaphysically fixed, human nature. I conclude with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of my models, relationships among and between them, and implications for practice

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Citations of this work

Toward a shallow interpretivist model of sport.Sinclair A. MacRae - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (3):285-299.
Strategic fouls: a new defense.Erin Flynn - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (3):342-358.
A Critique of Conventionalist Broad Internalism.J. S. Russell - 2018 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 12 (4):453-467.

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