Abstract

Steven Pinker observes that an evolutionary basis for morality invites nihilism because of the nature of evolutionary adaptation, which happens by chance and persists because of its survival value. Pinker thinks nihilism can be avoided because moral behavior may have evolved in conformance with an objective morality grounded in the logic and benefits of reciprocal, cooperative behavior. Even if there isn’t an objective morality, Pinker argues that our moral sense is “real for us” and can’t simply be dismissed. But the logic of reciprocal obligation – the difficulty in arguing that someone has an obligation towards you without your being similarly obliged -- only applies if we already accept someone having an obligation to do something rather than just finding it desirable. The net benefits of cooperation also do not imply obligations. While morality is still “real for us,” this too falls short of the objective grounding of morality needed to refute nihilism. We can have morality, but we are on our own in defending it