Two conceptions of happiness

Philosophical Review 88 (2):167-197 (1979)
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Abstract

I argue that the many similarities between what aristotle says about "eudaimonia" and what we say about happiness justify the traditional translation of "eudaimonia" as "happiness." it is not widely realized that "eudaimonia" involves a psychological state much like the one we call "happiness." nor is it generally recognized that both "eudaimonia" and "happiness" involve a standard for evaluating lives. For aristotle, The standard is objective and inflexible; for us, It is subjective and flexible. Thus, When we call someone happy and aristotle says he is not "eudaimon", We are not using two different concepts, But rather two different ways of evaluating lives

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Richard Kraut
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

The Good in Happiness.Jonathan Phillips, Sven Nyholm & Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 253–293.
Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?Daniel M. Haybron & Valerie Tiberius - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):712--733.
Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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