Cooperation or Defection Strategies of Conduct in Conflict-Prone Situations

Dialogue and Universalism 18 (4-6):119-125 (2008)
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Abstract

The simple model of conflict-prone situations called Prisoner’s Dilemma is discussed. Whereas the best strategy for the model is to defect, in the case of its iterated version (Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma—IPD) it is possible and more profitable to cooperate with the opponent.The simple strategy called Tit for Tat (TFT) which is easy to recognize, never defects first, punishes every defection but is also forgiving is presented. The TFT strategy is very successful being able to establish the cooperation with its opponents. The possible outcome of the competition between the TFT strategy and non-cooperative strategies is considered. It turns out that even small number of TFT strategies can overcome the greater number of more “egoistic” strategies.The described model can give the better understanding of some psychological, sociological and biological processes as well as help to propagate the altruistic attitudes in the society

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