The Possibility of the Existence of Metaphysics as a Science in Kant’s Views

Visnyk of the Lviv University Series Philosophical Sciences 31 (1) (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The article examines I. Kant’s philosophical views on the problems of scientific knowledge of social reality, the limits of applying judgmental and rational thinking in scientific reflection, as well as the issues of objectivity and the boundaries of applying the «sciences of the spirit», including the construction of metaphysics as a strictly scientific system of knowledge. The relevance of the problem posed by the philosopher is proven, which will remain present in scientific discourse for the following centuries and will become a foundational issue in the problematic fields of the methodology of scientific knowledge in the 19th and 20th centuries, retaining its relevance to this day. The article outlines the crisis situation in the field of metaphysics as a system of knowledge in the 18th century and highlights the main causes of this phenomenon. Kant’s view on the lack of development in metaphysics is demonstrated and analyzed, leading to stagnation and the decline of philosophical knowledge, if not all of philosophy. The main causes of this decline are outlined, and the key ways suggested by the German philosopher to overcome this crisis state are explored. The review addresses dogmatism, detachment from reality, and the lack of clear criteria for scientificity, considering their negative impact on the construction of scientific knowledge systems. Kant’s proposed criteria for scientificity are discussed, which allow a clear division of systems of knowledge into scientific and non-scientific, in turn enabling the approach to defining science as a discipline to be universal. The importance of building metaphysics on the principles of logic is justified, particularly the use of apodictic proof, to avoid relying on the argument from authority, one of the greatest and most widespread dangers to the development of metaphysics and its transformation into a strict science. The fundamental role of experience in the construction of scientific knowledge is demonstrated, which led the German philosopher to propose clear rules establishing the logical and correct way of constructively addressing experience and preventing its incorrect application.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,583

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-03-22

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references