Environmental interference

Biology and Philosophy 39 (5):1-22 (2024)
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Abstract

One of the guiding ideas in modern environmentalist thought is that we shouldn’t interfere with nature. It’s better to leave it alone. Many of the arguments offered in favor of this presumption against environmental interference are epistemic. One such argument focuses on ineffectiveness. It says that conservation interventions often do not accomplish their goals. A second argument says that well-intentioned interference in nature produces many harmful unintended consequences. I show that these arguments do not justify the presumption against environmental interference. Both arguments depend on stronger claims, such as the claim that conservation interventions do more harm than good overall. Yet, evidence-based conservation studies do not support the idea that conservation interventions generally do not work, or that they do more harm than good. These facts seriously undermine the presumption against environmental interference.

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Karen Kovaka
University of Pennsylvania

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