Carnap as a Beall-style logical monist

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-16 (2023)
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Abstract

There was a time when both Rudolf Carnap and Jc Beall were thought to be arch logical pluralists. Beall has since renounced his pluralistic views, but Carnap is still largely regarded as a pluralist. In this paper, I will show that there is good reason to think that Carnap is not a logical pluralist, at least in the way he is presented in the literature. Instead, I argue, he can be seen as a Beall-style logical monist at the meta-level, in line with the views expressed in Beall (APHI 14:1–29, 2017 and NOUS 28:30–54, 2018).

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Teresa Kouri Kissel
Old Dominion University

References found in this work

Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 249-264.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

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