Abstract

My thesis focuses on the connection between conversation and virtue in Plato’s dialogues. It is often argued that conversation is an instrumental good - that it is conducted in order to obtain knowledge, and more precisely, knowledge of virtue. And once one obtains this knowledge, one can go about one’s life and act virtuously. I am proposing that conversation is a final good. My starting point is the analysis of the Apology, and by taking seriously Socrates’ claim at 38a that ‘it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day’ I establish that conversation is something to be done for its own sake and I take this to mean that it is a place for interlocutors to display virtue. Moreover, I use the Apology to argue that Socrates has not always been aware of conversation being an end in itself. I then focus on three dialogues - the Laches, the Euthyphro and the Charmides to show us, both through their content and their drama, that virtues can and indeed should be exhibited in conversation.