Abstract

INDIVIDUUM AND INDIVIDUALITY The analysis of some John Duns Scotus’ works This book concerns the problem of the principle of individuation and related issues in the following works of John Duns Scotus: De Principio Individuationis (Lectura in librum secundum Sententiarum, distinctio 3, pars I, q. 1-7), De Principio Individuationis (Ordinatio II, distinctio 3, pars I, q. 1-7) and Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (liber VII, q. 13, 14 i 15). Some remarks were made about Scotus’ position on the indivituation of the human soul which was presented in the text: Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306. Die Verteidigung des thomistischen Individuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guillelmus Petri de Godino OP (Thomas von Aquino. Interpretation und Rezeption, Studien und Texte, herausg. W.P. Eckert OP, Mainz 1974, pp. 559-608). The first chapter presents the extention of the term “individual”, the second the intention of the term “individuality” according to John Duns Scotus. The third shows Scotus' critique of the negative and the positive theories of individuation and presents the way and reasons why Scotus refutes these solutions. The fourth chapter is an attempt to clarify Scotus' own views on the ontological status of: common nature, individual entity, that is the principle of individuation (historically known as haecceitas), and the relation between them. The last chapter is devoted to epistemological and axiological considerations. The book also contains an introduction that consists of two parts. The first one presents the evolution of the understanding of the notions “unity/plurality” and “universality/individuality” from Greek to Christian thought. The second one shows the chronological order of Scotus’ works devoted to the problem of individuation and the philosophical and theological context of this problem. The analysis of Scotus’ texts allows us to come to the following conclusions. When we try to identify the extention of “individual” we may say that Scotus adopts a kind of moderate realism. According to him, not only do individuals have a real being but also neutral natures have a kind of unity and being. When Scotus presents the necessity of reality of the neutral nature (quiddity) he uses arguments based on the analysis of our sensitive and intellectual knowledge. The arguments are based on the analysis of human knowledge and of some real relations such as singularity, identity and equality. Scotus concludes that the human mind would not grasp a singular thing in a universal manner if this thing were singular by itself. Being singular by itself would exclude the possibility of conceptual intellectual knowledge. The real relations mentioned above must have their foundation in something in reality, something that has some kind of unity; otherwise they would only be a product of our mind. This unity is real, but less than numerical and it justifies the fact that there are degrees of diversity between things. We should affirm that there is a real foundation for making comparison between two objects. This foundation is necessary for objectivity in our knowledge. The real structure (i.e. the neutral nature), causally independent of our mind is a necessary condition for the objectivity of our concepts. Because of that, our concepts are not the simple production of our mind (totum figmentum). In this way Scotus tries to explain his theory of common nature. This common nature is the foundation of our conceptual knowledge and it needs an individuating factor to become a singular thing. The theory of neutral nature allows us to understand why we perceive the real resemblance between singulars which belong to the same species. On the other hand this neutral nature is the reason why the univocal generation is possible in the physical world. The set of individuals then consists of beings which are neither neutral natures nor universals. Scotus enumerates some types of the individual beings: persons, substances and artefacts. By the way he discusses the theory of individuation of such beings as: the components of substances and the particular accidents. When we want to ask a serious question about individuation we should refute the thesis that every thing that exists is only individual. So we should refute nominalism. For the nominalist the individuation question is a pseudo-problem. Duns criticises nominalism by his theory of the neutral nature. The neutral nature (natura communis) is real but it does not have the numerical unity. Such reality is also not a universal being. We may say that individuals and real natures are real, but only the individuals exist (because they have acts of existence – esse existentiae). Moderate realism permits Scotus to ask questions about the principle of individuation as well as about the cause of universality. The first answer is the haecceity, the second one is our mind. Scotus also criticises exaggerated realism. If the neutral nature was a universal being, the same nature would be the property (as an idea) of two different individuals. Such a consequence is unacceptable. All the individuals (with the exception of God) demand the principle of individuation. Individuation is a kind of process (not a physical but metaphysical) by which the neutral nature receives the features related to individuality. Scotus refutes the theories of individuation expounded by his adversaries and, at the same time, presents his own view on the principle of individuation. The problem of individuation is a metaphysical problem, so the term 'singularity' is understood as a prima intentio not as a intentio secunda. As first intentions refer to real things, the result is that Duns Scotus searches for a real ontological cause for anything being a single entity. Thus singularity of things is not simply a product of human mind. The main goal of Scotus' discussion about the nominalist (or conceptualist) position is to show that no thing is individual by itself. Because common nature is real it needs an individuating factor to become a singular thing. This factor cannot be a twofold negation, as Henry of Ghent wanted. According to Henry of Ghent it is owing to this negation that one thing is not another thing and the same thing is not multiplied in itself. Scotus claims that a double negation only describes a situation that is a result of individuation and asks about the component that causes this negation in a singular thing. Neither the individuality is the result of the action of a natural extrinsic agent because the individuality as a perfection is connected with a substantial category and should not be based on relation. Nor can actual existence be the principle of individuation because it is outside the category of substance and an individual is fully determined as an individual regardless of its actual being. However, Scotus does not mean that individuals have acts of existence previous to their creation. He only suggests that the principle of individuation must be an element deriving from the essential, not from the existential, features of a thing. Duns Scotus uses a similar argument to refute the theory of individuation by quantity and by a set of accidents. Quantity is an accident, so it is also posterior to individuality of a substance and it is not able to cause this individuality. Adopting quantity as the principle of individuation may lead to the following surprising consequence: in a process of destruction a piece of quantity belonging to an individual "A" may become a piece of quantity of an individual "B". If the individuality of a thing depended on quantity, the individuals "A" and "B" would be the same individual, which seems to be absurd. Scotus treats matter in a similar way: it may be abstracted from things and, as such, it is common to many individuals. Furthermore, matter is indeterminate and indistinct in itself, so it cannot cause a distinction between individuals. At last the form taking as the quiddity cannot be the principle of individuation because it is the principle of similarity. Then Scotus has to ask: why the form is ¬this form. All Scotus' arguments against the mentioned views help him to define his demands on the principle of individuation and to highlight the crucial role it plays in being. First of all, the principle of individuation must be something real and positive, intrinsic to a thing and the category of substance, independent of other quidditative or existential characteristics. Such a factor must be indivisible in itself, it must possess its own perfection, and be in itself something singular, diverse and unique for each individual. It must be a component of being, in Scotus' language a formal entity, which is responsible for the final actualisation of a thing independently of a thing's act of existence. This factor has got its own real unity, a numerical one, by virtue of which it can give singularity to a thing. As a component, which is incapable of being abstracted, it does not add anything to the quidditative characteristics of a singular thing. We are not able to know this factor directly, due to the imperfection of our intellect, but we can only understand its features and functions by a philosophical analysis using the method of analogy. Sometimes Duns Scotus names this factor 'individual differentia' and emphasises that the 'nature' of this factor will become clearer when we compare the individual differentia with the specific differentia. By analogy to the function of the specific differentia, the individuating factor is added to common nature (which is responsible for specific features of a thing), to determine this nature as one single substance. Moreover, haecceity is the principle that makes a single thing incapable of division into subjective parts, so we can say that by haecceity individual is nonexemplifiable. Finally, such a principle of individuation is the principle of diversity of individuals in one species, their relative identity, incommunicability and the uniqueness of each of them. The diversity of terminology that Duns uses for the ontological status of haecceity creates difficulty when we interpret his ideas. In “Lectura” he claims that the principle of the individuation is the formal entity (formalitas). The relation between this principle and common nature is the same as the relation between the act and the potency. Next Scotus in “Ordinatio”, probably because of his theory of the absolutely simple notions, claims that the principle of the individuation is the ultimate reality of the form (ultima realitas formae). The relation between such a principle of individuation and common nature is the same as that between the quasi-act and the quasi-potency. Moreover, in “Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis” he points out that the principle of individuation is the individual form (forma individualis) or the individuating grade (gradus individualis). All these positions are coherent because Duns, in all his texts, claims that the principles of individuation are primary diverse (primo diversae) it means that they have nothing in common. Socrate’s haecceity and Plato’s haecceity are not of the same nature. We cannot abstract them because they are not repeatable for each individual being, so they do not have a common nature. The structure of the individual being we may characterise as follows: each individual (with the exception of God) is composed of an entity of common nature (i.e. the quiddity or the species nature) and the individuating entity. The kind of composition they make is essential unity (unum per se), so the haecceity is not an accidental form of the quiddity. Hecceity belongs to the category of substance but not to the category of any accident. In the “Lectura” and “Ordinatio” this type of unity Scotus explains by his theory of the formal distinction or the medium distinction, in his “Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis” by his theory of the unitevely contained entities (perfectiones unitive contentae). In a particular being the haecceity and the common nature are not separable even by God, so the first could not exist without the second. The analyses of Scotus’ texts led us to formulate the following definition of the principle of individuation: haecceity is not accidental, not an abstractable real entity that is the cause of non-exemplification, determination, uniquness, relative identity and perfection. Such a factor must have the features that it give to an individual, combining with common nature to create unity per se. At last Scotus says that the beauty and the order in the world lies on individuals. If this is so, individuals are the main goal and intention of God. It guarantees the perfection and superiority of individuals above universal beings.