Abstract

Implicitly grounded seemings are impulses to believe which arise from thought processes of which the subject is not conscious, and implicitly grounded beliefs are beliefs that are grounded in such seemings. Many epistemologists would say that argumentative support is not needed in order for basic perceptual, memory, introspective, or a priori beliefs to count as warranted. One can know directly, based merely in its seeming so, that it is sunny outside, that one had eggs for breakfast, that one has a pain in one's shoulder, or that 2 + 1 = 3. I argue in this dissertation that some people in some circumstances can also know directly that it is unwise to give someone money, that a job applicant would not be an asset to the company, that a friend is upset, or that there is something wrong with their child. ;The first chapter addresses the kinds of inputs and influences that might contribute to the formation of a basic belief, and examines the nature and origin of implicitly grounded beliefs. The second chapter distinguishes IGSs from other kinds of seemings. The third chapter explores the notions of "belief," "basic belief," and finally "properly basic belief." The fourth chapter begins the examination of implicitly grounded beliefs by looking at them in light of the main qualities warranted beliefs are thought to have. I argue that believing in accordance with an IGS can be a good way of pursuing the epistemic truth goal, of fulfilling epistemic duty, of expressing intellectual virtue, and of exhibiting proper function. I answer objections to IGBs being considered warranted, including the objection that they are subject to unwieldy influences, that they don't issue from a faculty, and that accepting them as properly basic means one must consider warranted all manner of odd beliefs. In the fifth chapter I argue that those criteria for proper basicality which are plausible allow that IGBs can be properly basic in the right circumstances. The sixth chapter summarizes the arguments of the dissertation, and briefly suggests how its conclusions are relevant to some current debates in epistemology