Revisiting the Epistemic Regress of Dispositions

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):625-632 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/pq/pqz052

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The regress of pure powers?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534.
Epistemic Dispositions: Reply to Turri and Bronner.Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):629-636.
Causation, Laws and Dispositions.Andreas Hüttemann - 2007 - In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.
Rational Doxastic Dispositions and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):589-607.
Reply to Armstrong on dispositions.James Franklin - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):86-87.
Artificial Dispositions: Investigating Ethical and Metaphysical Issues.William A. Bauer & Anna Marmodoro (eds.) - 2023 - New York: Bloomsbury.
Four Theories of Pure Dispositions.William A. Bauer - 2011 - In Alexander Bird, Brian David Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. New York: Routledge. pp. 139-162.
Manifestations as effects.Jennifer McKitrick - 2010 - In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. New York: Routledge.
The Return of Causal Powers?Andreas Hüttemann - 2021 - In Stathis Psillos, Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-185.
Are dispositions reducible to categorical properties?James Franklin - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):62-64.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-23

Downloads
32 (#718,209)

6 months
8 (#633,132)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Kodaj
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties.Alexander Bird - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Properties, causation and projectability.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Laurence Jonathan Cohen & Mary Brenda Hesse (eds.), Applications of inductive logic: proceedings of a conference at the Queen's College, Oxford 21-24, August 1978. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 291-312.

Add more references