Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later

Psychologica Belgica 42:113-130 (2002)
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Abstract

It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possible to show that there are a number of distinct actorobserver asymmetries in explanation, each stemming from a distinct psychological process by which explanations are generated.

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2009-01-28

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Author Profiles

Joshua Knobe
Yale University
Bertram F. Malle
Brown University

Citations of this work

Reason explanation in folk psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.
Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.

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References found in this work

Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.

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