Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):165-179 (2022)
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Abstract

Subjectivism about wellbeing rests on the idea that what is good for a person must ‘fit’ her, ‘resonate’ with her, not be ‘alien’ to her, etc. This idea has been called the ‘beating heart’ of subjectivism. In this article, I present the No-Beating-Heart Challenge for subjectivism, which holds that there is no satisfactory statement of this idea. I proceed by first identifying three criteria that any statement of the idea must meet if it is to provide support for subjectivism: Distinctness, Exclusiveness, and Explicitness. I then argue that no statement of this idea meets these criteria.

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Peter Königs
Dortmund University

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Slaves of the passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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