Abstract

Higher-order evidence, such as that arising from peer disagreement, is typically bracketed in scholarly argumentation. For instance, we do not challenge a philosophical position by noting that it is subject to peer disagreement. Two questions related to this phenomenon remain unresolved: 1) Why is scholarly argumentation governed by a norm against the use of higher-order evidence? 2) Which higher-order evidence is affected by this norm? This article argues, first, that the reason higher-order evidence is bracketed is not related to the sincerity with which we may hold our views, or to the promotion of cognitive diversity. Rather, it is due to the inconclusive nature of arguments based on higher-order evidence. Second, it argues that the ban on higher-order evidence extends to all types of higher-order evidence, not just a subset. The rationale behind banning higher-order evidence suggests that philosophical inquiry aims at solving philosophical questions with a high degree of conclusiveness, even if this aim might only be achieved in the far future.