How the Self-Defeating Argument Against Determinism Defeats Itself

Dialogue 25 (2):239- (1986)
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Citations of this work

Determination and Consciousness in Marx.Charles W. Mills - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):421 - 445.
Self-Defeat Is Not So Frequent.Tom Settle - 1987 - Dialogue 26 (2):357-.

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References found in this work

Determinism's Dilemma.James N. Jordan - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (1):48 - 66.
The transcendental refutation of determinism.William Hasker - 1973 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):175-183.
Is determinism self-refuting?Karl R. Popper - 1983 - Mind 92 (January):103-4.
Truth's debt to freedom.Warner Wick - 1964 - Mind 73 (292):527-537.

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