In Defense of Bertrand: The Non-Restrictiveness of Reasoning by Example

Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3):365-370 (2013)
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Abstract

This note has three goals. First, we discuss a presentation of Bertrand's paradox in a recent issue of Philosophia Mathematica, which we believe to be a subtle but important misinterpretation of the problem. We compare claims made about Bertrand with his 1889 Calcul des Probabilités. Second, we use this source to understand Bertrand's true intention in describing what we now call his paradox, comparing it both to another problem he describes in the same section and to a modern treatment. Finally, we briefly consider the importance of knowing when a specific example represents a general case

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References found in this work

Calcul des Probabilités.Joseph Bertrand - 1888 - Gauthier-Villars Et Fils.
Bertrand's work on probability.Oscar Sheynin - 1994 - Archive for History of Exact Sciences 48 (2):155-199.

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