Reason, Trust, and Relationships: Argument and the disposition to co-operate

Abstract

If we want reasoning to bridge cultural differences, argumentation theory has to show when and why to invoke a “disposition to co-operate.” But it is crucial to re-interpret co-operation as a function of relationships and processes, not as a disposition of individuals. Co-operative relationships and processes can then provide the vital path from individual scepticism to the mutual trust needed to work through difficult disputes.

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Acknowledgment.[author unknown] - 2001 - Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (6):789-790.
Acknowledgment.[author unknown] - 2003 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (6):781-782.

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