Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show (1) that scepticism, in both its traditional forms and contemporary forms, poses no real threat to obtaining inferential empirical knowledge, even if such knowledge requires certainty and (2) that there are some significant lessons to be learned from the traditional sceptics about what constitutes a plausible argument for scepticism and how to obtain knowledge while avoiding dogmatism and (3) that contemporary scepticism is based on several serious mistakes about what is required to obtain empirical knowledge because it both conflates knowing with being dogmatic and inflates the requirements for obtaining empirical knowledge. I will focus on _inferential_ empirical knowledge, rather than knowledge in general, in order to eliminate the necessity of defending one of the various responses to the problem of the regress of reasons. I will limit the discussion to inferential _empirical_ knowledge because it has been the primary target of contemporary arguments for scepticism. I aim to show that we are justified in rejecting the sceptic’s arguments but that we should not be certain that the sceptic is wrong. I hope that it will become obvious that such a seemingly incoherent set of beliefs is part of the correct description of our epistemic position.