Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore the natures of emotional pride and shame. Using elements from Hume’s discussion of pride and humility in Book 2 of the Treatise, as well as Gabriele Taylor’s analysis of pride and shame in Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, I argue against the view that pride and shame necessarily involve self-evaluations. Put another way, I reject the view that pride and shame necessarily constitute one’s judging that one has experienced some gain or loss in status, respectively. Instead, I contend that they are best understood as constituting one’s being importantly satisfied or dissatisfied with some aspect of an entity, whether oneself or an entity to which one stands in the relation of ‘belonging.’ In addition, I emphasize that the evaluations involved in pride and shame are made in light of the emoter’s beliefs, desires, values, etc. I do not dispute the fact that others’ views may shape one’s own. Rather, I claim that experiences of pride and shame importantly reflect the emoter’s values, beliefs, desires, norms of expectations, etc. Finally, I stress that unless one is able to acknowledge that the entity in question is capable of failing to meet one’s expectations, one cannot experience pride or shame. Notably, in the case of pride, unless one believes it is possible for the entity to fail to meet one's standards, one cannot truly feel satisfied that the entity in question met or exceeded one’s standards.