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Reconciling Austinian and Russellian accounts of the liar paradox
Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):451 - 494 (1994)
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Citations of this work
A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.
References found in this work
The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity.Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy - 1987 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by John Etchemendy.
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