Abstract

Aristotle often says ‘the prohairesis, the conclusion of deliberation, is a combination between nous and orexis ’. However, what he actually means by this remark is rather unclear. Is the prohairesis an actual action? Scholars have argued that the prohairesis is an action, claiming that the relationship between reason and desire here is of such a nature that the prohairesis becomes an actual action, at least in the context of ‘the euboulia’. Yet, this view seems inadequate, because although it seem evident that the prohairesis results from the combination of reason and desire, Aristotle never uses the terms ‘prohairesis’ to indicate an actual action or a force needed to initiate an action. Instead, I will claim that Aristotle means no more than that the prohairesis is the conclusion of deliberation, in which reason and desire have already been brought together. Hence, the thesis that the combination of reason and desire means that the prohairesis is an action, cannot be accepted. Rather, I will argue that the prohairesis is a decision, a combination of the best judgment of what to do and the correct intention that follows it.