Abstract

In this thesis I attempt to diagnose one important aspect of the mind-body problem. If my argument is right, there has been one critical mistake in dealing with this philosophical puzzle. My analyses are on a priori arguments, rather than theories, by Descartes, Kripke and Davidson in the main, which are meant to 'prove' the ontological status of the mind. ;In Chapter One, I identify the issue of our inquiry as the dispute between the view that the mind can exist without the body and the view that the mind cannot exist without the body . ;In Chapter Two, I reconstruct Descartes' epistemological argument for ontological dualism which, if sound, is strong enough to rule out the possibility of ontological materialism, and develop what I call the 'Non-Entailment Thesis '; Descartes' argument is shown to be a failure by virtue of the NET. ;In Chapter Three, I introduce the type identity thesis as a challenge to ontological dualism, and discuss in detail Kripke's argument against it. Kripke's argument with his 'possible world' semantics in its background has gained a rare philosophical consensus that the type identity thesis has no hope for surviving Kripke's attack. Nevertheless, my analysis will show that Kripke's argument, surprisingly, violates the NET. ;In Chapter Four, I discuss Davidson's argument for anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has attracted a great philosophical attention and popularity since it is designed to prove ontological materialism on a ground where mental phenomena are efficacious and anomalous. This view has been believed by many philosophers to be immune to Kripke's attack, but turns out helpless to my argument from the NET. ;In the concluding chapter, I show the possibility of attaining knowledge despite the force of the NET, and propose what we should do to be able to properly deal with the mind-body issue in light of the lesson of my thesis.