Can realists reason with reasons?

Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):159-169 (2022)
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Abstract

I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary belief...

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10.1080/13869795.2022.2042587

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Christian Kietzmann
Universität Leipzig

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Physics.Daniel W. Aristotle & Graham - 2018 - Hackett Publishing Company.

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