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Are stomachs rational?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):91-92 (2009)
Abstract
Oaksford & Chater (O&C) would need to define rationality if they want to argue that stomachs are not rational. The question of rationality, anyhow, is orthogonal to the debate concerning whether humans use classical deductive logic or probabilistic reasoningAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Practical beliefs vs. scientific beliefs: two kinds of maximization.Elias L. Khalil - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (1):107-126.
Reasoning Studies. From Single Norms to Individual Differences.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Freiburg
Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models. [REVIEW]Frederick Eberhardt & David Danks - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):389-410.
References found in this work
Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
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