Abstract

Avicenna's logic has gathered much interest in recent decades. However, one significant point that has hitherto been frequently neglected is what logic means to Avicenna in the first place. Considering this issue, the main aim of this paper is to investigate Avicenna's account of logic. This is done by focusing on the logical sections of five of his comprehensive works, namely, the Kitāb al-Madkhal (of the Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, the Cure), al-Najāt (the Salvation), Dānishnāmi-yi ʿAlāʾ ī (Philosophy for ʿAlāʾ-ad-Dawla), al-Mashriqiyyūn (the Easterners) and al-Ishārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt (the Pointers and Reminders). The reason for choosing these five works is fourfold, namely, logico-philosophical, linguistic, chronological and diversity of intended audience. Each work is analyzed based on the three fundamental elements which Avicenna links to the notion of logic, i.e. its definition, its status and its goal. The results of this analysis are then compared. Overall, Avicenna seems to have held a very stable account of logic across these works.