Consequentialism and the Case of Symmetrical Attackers

Utilitas 31 (4):395-413 (2019)
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Abstract

There are puzzle cases that forfeiture theory has trouble handling, such as the issue of what happens to the rights of two qualitatively identical people who simultaneously launch unprovoked attacks against the other. Each person either has or lacks the right to defend against the other. If one attacker has the right, then the other does not and vice versa. Yet the two are qualitatively identical so it is impossible for one to have the right if the other does not. The Problem of Symmetrical Attackers is a problem for non-consequentialism because the most plausible non-consequentialist theories assume that people have rights and can lose them by forfeiting them or waiving them. This article considers whether consequentialism can get around this problem.

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Stephen Kershnar
Fredonia State University

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