How many things must a speaker intend ?

Erkenntnis 15 (3):333-341 (1980)
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Abstract

Counterexarnples have been presented in which an S fulfils 1——3 in uttering some x but has an additional intention which makes the example a case of not meaning something by x. In the example given by Strawson it is not only true of S that 1——3 but also that 4b—4f: 43 1S{BAUs(BA(Is(7TA}}}}}.

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10.1007/bf02070842

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Andreas Kemmerling
University of Heidelberg

Citations of this work

Der 'intentionale fehlschluß' — ein dogma?Lutz Danneberg & Hans-Harald Müller - 1983 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (1):103-137.
Der ‚intentionale Fehlschluß‘ — ein Dogma?Lutz Danneberg & Hans-Harald Müller - 1983 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (2):376-411.

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References found in this work

Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Intention and convention in speech acts.Peter F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.
Language and reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90.
Meaning. [REVIEW]Gilbert H. Harman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (7):224-229.

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