Comments on Paul Horwich's "On the Alleged Normative Import of Implicit Definitions" (Workshop Implicit Definitions and A Priori Knowledge, GAP 6, Berlin, September 2006) [Book Review]

Abstract

Let R be an epistemic rule of the simplest type: "Accept sentence s!" Assume that R is a basic rule we actually follow: Our accepting the sentence cannot be explained by our following more fundamental rules of sentence-acceptance. Assume furthermore that we feel rationally obliged to follow R; that is, we all agree on the correctness of the epistemic norm N which says: We ought to accept s.

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Andreas Kemmerling
University of Heidelberg

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