Abstract

En este artículo se critica la forma en quePeacocke defiende la tesis de que laexperiencia tiene un contenido noconceptual.En particular, se argumentaquela apelación de Peacocke a la idea dequeel contenido no-conceptual de laexperienciaes mucho más fino que elcontenidoconceptual, no funciona.Finalmente,se sostiene que ladependenciade un objeto percibido conrespectoal contexto perceptual en el cualsepercibe, y la dependencia de unapropiedadpercibida con respecto alobjetoen el cual es percibida son rasgosmásrelevantes para la tesis de que elcontenidoperceptual de la experiencia esno-conceptual.In this paper I criticize the way in which Peacocke defends the thesis that experience has non-conceptual content. In particular, I argue that Peacocke’s reliance on the idea that the experience’s non conceptua lcontent is far more subtle than conceptual content, does not work. Lastly,Ihold that the dependence of a perceived objectfrom the perceptual context inwhichsuch an object is perceived, and thedependenceof a received property from the object in which it is perceived are more relevant features for the thesis that the perceptual content of experience is non-conceptual