Abstract

An intuitive conception of communication suggests two constraints on the language we use. Each of us must know what our words mean if we're to use them as a vehicle for communicating our thoughts, and the meaning of words must be common to both speaker and listener. I give a precise account of the intuitive conception of communication I'm working from, and its implications for a theory of meaning. I argue that meaning and reference are distinct, and if meaning is to play a role in communication, it must be related to the content of mental states in a significant way. I evaluate Putnam's and Davidson's theories of meaning against the background of the intuitive picture I've developed. Each of them has captured something significant about meaning, yet both leave us incapable of common knowledge of what our words mean. Proposals from Kaplan, Hintikka, Neale, Kamp and Heim for dealing with the related problems of "donkey sentences" and of substitution of terms in intentional or modal contexts provide support for an alternative approach to meaning. I show how representational theories of mind tie in with these proposals. I argue that meaning is a connection between words and the world via the mind of the user of language, that mental representations, understood as the contents of propositional attitudes, are the link, and that mental representations must be individuated non-relationally if they're to play this role