Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment

In Heidi Lene Maibom, Empathy and Morality. New York, NY: Oup Usa (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, my aim is to bring together contemporary psychological literature on emotion regulation and the classical sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith to arrive at a plausible account of empathy's role in explaining patterns of moral judgment. Along the way, I criticize related arguments by Michael Slote, Jesse Prinz, and others

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2013-06-22

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Antti Kauppinen
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

The Relational Value of Empathy.Monika Betzler - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2):136-161.
Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1963 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The emotional construction of morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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