Abstract

What does the term ‘Perception’ denote in Epistemology? Is it a first hand, indubitable cognition as the hardcore epistemologists regard or is it very close to ‘interpretation’ or ‘perspective’ as poststructuralists like Michel Foucault regard? The philosophical analysis of perception tries to give an account of what it is to perceive something. It also tries to give an account of the nature of object of perceptual experience. Perception raises special problem if it is supposed that there is necessarily a gap between our perceptual experience and the objective world around us which we claim toknow. If perception is an entirely subjective matter, then there seem greater reasons for scepticism concerning our claims to know the so – called external world. But what exactly perception is like? It has to be said that the conceptual problem, viz. the problem of the nature of our concept of perception, is in a sense prior to the epistemological problem, viz. the problem of the relation between perception and the knowledge of the external world. There is a very wide tendency among philosophers to offer an analysis of perceptual experience which splits up perceptual experience into the awareness of some private data, i.e. into sensations, and the act of interpreting this data as objects or object – properties. Philosophers differ in opinion about the genuine nature of perception with regard to these two elements, viz sensation and judgement. Some assimilate perception to sensation. In their opinion, perception means pure sensation. In this, the object is only presented to the senses. This awareness of the object is the genuine perception. The interpretation of the data, which the knower does after being aware of the object, is not perception because that is done by another faculty, viz. intellect and not by the senses. This controversy is found in booth Indian and Western philosophical traditions. Naiyayikas, the bahyartha – vadins, i.e., the realists in Indian tradition are of the opinion that savikalpaka pratyaksa, i.e. determinate perception is the genuine perception. They are the supports of the commonsense view. According to them perception is the direct cognition of the things as they are, and only determinate perception can provide us the knowledge of the things as they are. They have accepted the doctrine of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa only as a logical requirement. As against this, the Buddhist philosophers Dinnaga and Dharmakirti opine that nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is the genuine perception and the so – called savikalpaka pratyaksa’ is a pseudo – perception. According to the Buddhists, the function of sense – perception is only to present the object to the senses. And that is done by nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. In determinates cognition, the object is known as associated with name, from, attributes etc., But the name, from, attributes are not known through sense – perception, they are the products of conceptual construction. The nature of the ‘purely given’ in sense – perception is devoid of all attributes and categories. Therefore, nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is the genuine perception, and the savikalpaka jnana is included in the inference in broader sense. Present paper proposes to discuss the ancient Indian debate regarding perception between the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas from the epistemological point of view. And the attempt will also be made to trace the roots of this debate in the respective paradigms of reality. It will be brought to light that here is essential reciprocity between the ‘Episteme’ and the ‘Real’. And this is not the invention of the contemporary philosophy; it was realized from the early times of philosophy.