Abstract

My thesis is that capturing moral universality requires mind-independence and the support of ontology. The central question that my thesis will be asking is whether moral universality can be captured in the absence of mind-independence and the support of ontology. There are metaethical theories in contemporary metaethics which attempt to capture moral universality in the absence of mind-independence and the support of ontology. I selectively consider attempts made by T.M. Scanlon, Mark Schroeder, and Julia Markovits, all of which have received significant attention in contemporary literature. I evaluate each theory in their own light by tailoring my arguments to the respective theories in question and argue that those theories are not successful in capturing moral universality. My contribution to the literature will have attempted to establish what is required to capture moral universality by elucidating why and how previous attempts are unsuccessful. A pervasive theme throughout my evaluation is the extent to which moral norms can bind an agent who rejects such norms in the absence of moral universality. How, for example, we can be morally justified in holding one who rejects moral norms accountable for any transgression of those norms. My thesis aims to show that theories that fail to vindicate mind-independence and the support of ontology will struggle to capture moral universality.