Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: An extended study

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Artificial Intelligence 240 (C):65-103 (2016)
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10.1016/j.artint.2016.08.002

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'Superstition' in the pigeon.B. F. Skinner - 1948 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 38 (2):168.
The probability weighting function.Drazen Prelec - 1998 - Econometrica 66 (3):497–527.

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