Abstract

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This study examines the tenability of Leibniz's solution of the problem of freedom and determinism in relation to those of his predecessors, namely, Aquinas, Molina, Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza. ;Part I of the study examines: Aquinas' theory of free choice and shows the emphasis Aquinas lays on the notion of rational appetite; Molina's conception of freedom and contingency, highlighting the importance of his doctrine of scientia media to his solution of the problem of freedom and divine foreknowledge; Descartes' conception of the freedom of the will, arguing that his is not as necessitarian as Leibniz took him to be; and Hobbes' and Spinoza's necessitarianism, showing that Hobbes was not as necessitarian as Spinoza although both maintained that all possibles are actual. ;Part II of the study concerns Leibniz's conception of freedom and necessity. It is argued that his accounts of spontaneity and intelligence or rationality are adequate, and that the burden of the problem of reconciling freedom and determinism lies in his account of contingency. This study attempts to show that although indeed Leibniz's conception of contingency raises difficulties for his metaphysics, his solution of the problem of freedom and necessity is superior to those of his predecessors in that he clearly distinguishes logical necessity from determinism, causal necessity from logical necessity, necessity from contingency. Also, unlike his predecessors, Leibniz has a clear conception of the possible, and adequately proves that not all possibles are actual. Also, Part II includes a discussion and an evaluation of some major interpretations of Leibniz, and it is argued that in a way contingency can be accommodated in Leibniz. ;However, this study also shows Leibniz's indebtedness to Molina's doctrine of scientia media in his solution of the problem of freedom and divine foreknowledge, but highlights the fact that Leibniz resolves the difficulties confronting this doctrine by incorporating within it the notion of the possible. ;The Appendix is a discussion of Ralph Cudworth, where it is argued that Cudworth and Leibniz came to similar conclusions on both Hobbes' necessitarianism and the Molinistic conception of freedom despite a radical difference in their philosophy