Abstract

Based on the historical analysis of Carnap's and Quine's works, I argue that their debates on logical truth and analyticity reflect their differing views of logic, language and philosophy rather than the resolution of certain philosophical problems as a result of a rational discourse. Their different conceptions of logic in 1930s, together with their different views about the subject matter of philosophy, misled Quine about Carnap's position about logical truth and convention, leading to their later debate on logical truth. The difference between their views about the subject matter of philosophy subsequently resulted in their analyticity debate, whose eventual outcome was decisively dependent on their difference toward the factualism/realism, i.e., how the fact of the matter counts in philosophy. ;Carnap had the conception of logic as calculus as opposed to Quine's conception of logic as language in 1930s. Whereas Carnap viewed philosophy as a process of elucidation issuing in proposals for philosophers and scientists based on logical inquiries into languages, as opposed to substantive investigation of "reality", Quine viewed philosophy as a part of overall science concerned with "reality" tout court. From this point of view, Quine's philosophy is committed to strong realist assumptions whereas Carnap's is not. ;The debate between Carnap and Quine on logical truth and analyticity is reexamined, with the above result, on the basis of an historically appropriate analysis of Carnap's conception of Wissenschaftslogik, or logic of science, which represents the core of his philosophy from 1931 onward. In analyzing Carnap's Wissenschaftslogik, his work in the 1920's and 1930's, including unpublished manuscripts, is thoroughly examined. With regard to Quine's work, a particular attention is paid to changes in his position from 1930s and 1940s to 1950s and later. ;In spite of his tremendous contribution to analytic philosophy and logic in the twentieth century, Catnap's philosophy has not been appropriately appreciated and evaluated until very recently. The past decade, however, saw the emergence of new interest in his work from an historical perspective. This dissertation attempts to shed a further light on Carnap's philosophy