Quietist metaethical realism and moral determination

Ratio 34 (3):248-256 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Metaethical realists believe that moral facts exist, but they disagree among themselves about whether moral facts have ontological import. Robust realists think that they do. Quietist realists deny this. I argue that quietist realism faces a new objection; viz., the moral determination objection. This is the objection that general moral facts (or moral principles) must determine specific moral facts (or which actions in the world are right and wrong) but that general moral facts cannot do this if they lack ontological import. I also argue that some robust realists can answer the moral determination objection. This gives these robust realists an edge over quietist realism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,173

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism.Mark Warren & Amie Thomasson - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 526-53.
Robust moral realism: an excellent religion.David Killoren - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):223-237.
Facts, Values and Moral Realism.David Schejbal - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):37-50.
Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism.Aidan Lyon - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):559-578.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-28

Downloads
71 (#294,972)

6 months
11 (#338,628)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Wouter Kalf
Leiden University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
On what there is.W. V. Quine - 1953 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-19.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.

View all 23 references / Add more references