Abstract

I wish to examine the “justification” or “vindication” of inductive procedure that has been set forth in various places by the late Professor Reichenbach and by Professor Feigl, most recently by the latter. Although Professor Feigl has explicitly referred to this kind of a “vindication” as “trivial,” it is nevertheless evident, from the stress placed upon and the space devoted to this proposal, that both Professors Feigl and Reichenbach attach considerable importance to it. Thus Professor Feigl says:It has to be shown that the normal inductive procedure is reasonable, not merely by definition in the light of common usage, but that this definition itself is not merely a result of linguistic habituation or of an arbitrary fiat. This can be achieved, as I have tried to show..., largely in agreement with Reichenbach's ideas, if the adoption of the rule of induction is made a matter of practical justification rather than a matter of theoretical justification.