Abstract

Locke is mainly concerned to articulate an epistemology that avoids the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of skepticism. He insists that there is much about the world that we do not know and that we are all capable of acquiring a good deal of knowledge, particularly in the domains of religion and ethics. This chapter begins by discussing (i) Locke's official account of the nature of knowledge, and the distinction he draws between knowledge and judgment (belief, assent); (ii) his seemingly tripartite division of knowledge into intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive; (iii) the anti‐dogmatic and anti‐skeptical aspects of his epistemology; and (iv) how this theory applies to claims of divine revelation, including those made by religious “enthusiasts.” At the end of the Essay, Locke turns his attention to what can be known or reasonably believed in matters of religion, and in particular to the proper relationship between faith and reason.