Is the status principle beyond salvation? Toward redeeming an unpopular theory of hell

Sophia 44 (1):91-103 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I examine a recent objection to the retributive punishment theory of hell, specifically that the theory entails something obviously false: that it is possible to commit an infinite sin. I defend the moral principle behind one account of infinite sin, a principle referred to as the Status Principle (that other things being equal the higher the status of the offended the party, the more serious the sin). I show that recent objections to this principle are far from conclusive, and that the principle is more plausible than perhaps initially thought.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,743

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reincarnation and infinite punishment in hell.Gianluca Di Muzio - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (2):167-180.
An Absolute Principle of Truthmaking.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):1-31.
A Defence of the Control Principle.Martin Sand - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):765-775.
The Moral Problem of Other Minds.Jeff Sebo - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:51-70.
The Permissibility of Deterrence.Steven Sverdlik - 2018 - In Christian Seidel, Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Be Fruitful, but Do Not Multiply.Nathaniel Stagg - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
86 (#260,340)

6 months
18 (#169,748)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references