­A Defense of Analogy Inference as Sui generis

Logic and Logical Philosophy 29 (2):259-309 (2020)
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Abstract

Accounts of analogical inference are usually categorized into four broad groups: abductive, deductive, inductive and sui generis. The purpose of this paper is to defend a sui generis model of analogical inference. It focuses on the sui generis account, as developed by Juthe [2005, 2009, 2015, 2016] and Botting’s [2017] criticism of it. This paper uses the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation as the methodological framework for analyzing and reconstructing argumentation. The paper has two main points. First, that Juthe’s arguments against a deductive interpretation of prima facie analogy argumentation remain unaffected by Botting’s criticism, which means that many of the reasons against deductive reformulation of analogy argumentation still stand. The additional argument, which Botting himself brings up, that a deductive interpretation cannot account for the cumulative effect of analogies, just provides further reason to reject deductivism. The second main point of this paper is that an inductive interpretation of analogical inference also fails. There are constitutional differences between inductive and analogical inference that cannot be bridged. The result is a firm defense of the sui generis view of analogical inference.

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Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Argument by Analogy.André Juthe - 2005 - Argumentation 19 (1):1-27.
Analogies and Missing Premises.Trudy Govier - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (3).

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