consent and deception

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):223-229 (2017)
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Abstract

Tom Dougherty has recently defended the claim that all deception that is consequential for sex is seriously wrong. This discussion piece argues that deception does not have to seriously undermine consent and that when sexual deception is seriously wrong, that may not only be to do with its relation to consent. In doing so, it defends distinguishing between the seriousness of deceptions, whether these are sexual or in other areas of life, and so defends what Dougherty calls the lenient view.

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Robert Jubb
University of Reading

Citations of this work

Deception and Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2017 - In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. New York, NY: Routledge.
Elusive Consent.Alexandra Lloyd - 2021 - Public Affairs Quarterly 34.
Deceiving Someone into Having Sex.Shirah Theron - 2023 - Stellenbosch Socratic Journal 3:35-46.

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References found in this work

Sex, Lies, and Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):717-744.

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