Abstract

Abstract:My aim in this article is to explore the role of perspectivism—roughly, the view that works of art prescribe a certain perspective—in aesthetic cognitivism and in the ethical evaluation of art, particularly as it features in the value-interaction debate. Although I am critical of perspectivism’s capacity to shoulder an artwork’s cognitive and ethical value, I find some of the arguments mounted against it, most notably those by Ted Nannicelli, misdirected, and I present several arguments against them. However, because my aim is to show that both aesthetic cognitivism and ethical criticism should move beyond a concern for the perspective, I offer a different criticism of perspectivism to demonstrate how it should be modified if it is to make a more substantial contribution to the ethical evaluation of art. I conclude by providing a sketch of what I call ethically minded criticism of art, that is, one that is concerned not with a perspective that a work advances but with revealing work’s cognitive and ethical insights, that is thus better suited to promoting art’s educational and cultural value.