Is the no-minimum claim true? Reply to Cullison

Religious Studies 47 (1):125 - 127 (2011)
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Abstract

Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong

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Jeff Jordan
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

Can God Satisfice?Klass Kraay - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):399-410.
Vagueness and the Problem of Evil: a New Reply to van Inwagen.Luis Oliveira - 2021 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 44 (4):49-82.
God and Gratuitous Evil (Part II).Klaas J. Kraay - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):913-922.

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References found in this work

Evil and Van Inwagen.Jeff Jordan - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):236-239.
Vagueness and Pointless Evil.Michael Schrynemakers - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:245-254.

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