How we reason: a view from psychology

The Reasoner 2:4-5 (2008)
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Abstract

Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning

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9780199551330

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Peter Johnson
Lincoln University

Citations of this work

Reasoning processes in propositional logic.Claes Strannegård, Simon Ulfsbäcker, David Hedqvist & Tommy Gärling - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):283-314.

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